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Abstract
We introduce a family of logics that are particularly useful for reasoning with uncertainty.
The consequence relations considered here are dened by a simple and natural semantics,
and have many desirable properties. In particular, these relations are nonmonotonic, para-
consistent, adaptive in the sense of Batens, plausibility logics in the sense of Lehmann, and
rational in the sense of Lehmann and Magidor.
1 Introduction
In this work we investigate and characterise a family of consequence relations for reasoning with
uncertainty. Generally, we consider two types of uncertainty:
a) The data is incomplete. In such cases only a partial information about the domain of
discourse is available, and so one has to draw conclusions despite the lack of knowledge.
b) The data is inconsistent, thus one has to make inferences from a contradictory information.
It is well-known that classical logic cannot deal properly with these types of uncertainty.
This is so mainly due to the fact that classically any formula is a logical consequence of an
inconsistent theory, and so one cannot make classical inferences from inconsistent knowledge-
bases in a non-trivial way. Moreover, being monotonic, classical logic cannot support default
reasoning, and so its use with incomplete information is problematic as well.
We follow here a common approach to overcome the shortcomings of classical logic by turn-
ing to multiple-valued logics. Many formalisms for reasoning with many-valued semantics have
been proposed in the literature, using every possible number of truth-values, from three values
(see, e.g., [5] for a survey of some natural three-valued logics), up to arbitrarily many values
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(used e.g., in possiblistic logics [12], annotated logics [26, 27], and many formalisms that are
based on fuzzy logic or probabilistic reasoning. See, for example, a survey in [22]). In most of
these approaches the truth-values are arranged in a lattice structure. Lattices, and in particular
a special family of them, called logical lattices, will be our main semantical tool here.
Our major concern here will be to recapture within this multy-valued framework classical
reasoning (where its use is appropriate), as well as some standard non-monotonic and para-
consistent methods. For that, we incorporate a concept rst introduced by McCarthy [21] and
later by Shoham [25]. They suggested that in order to make inferences from a given theory one
should consider only a subset of the models of that theory. This set of preferential models is
determined according to some conditions that can be specied syntactically by a set of (usually
second-order) propositions, or semantically by using some order relation on the models of the
theory. This relation should reect some kind of preference criterion on the models of the set
of premises. In our case the idea is to give precedence to those valuations that minimize the
amount of inconsistent belief in the set of premises. This approach reects the intuition that
while one has to deal with conicts in a nontrivial way, contradictory data corresponds to inad-
equate information about the real world, and therefore should be minimized.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: In next section we introduce our framework and
demonstrate its usefulness by using some simple toy examples. In Section 3 we characterise the
consequence relations that are induced by this framework. This allows us to consider, in Section
4, some useful properties of these relations, which make them particularly suitable for imitating
commonsense reasoning. In Section 5 we compare our approach to some related formalisms, and
in Section 6 we conclude.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Logical lattices and their consequence relations
In what follows we denote by L = (L;) a bounded lattice that has at least three elements
(\truth values"): A -maximal element and a -minimal element that correspond to the clas-
sical values (denoted, respectively, by t and f), and an intermediate element (denoted by >)
that may intuitively be understood as representing contradictions. As usual, the meet and the
join operations on L are denoted by ^ and _. In addition, we assume that L has an involution
operator : (a \negation") s.t. :t=f , :f= t, and :>=>. We denote by D the set of the desig-
nated values of L (i.e., the set of the truth values in L that represent true assertions). We shall
assume that D is a prime lter in L,
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and that >2D. The pair (L;D) is called a logical lattice [4].
The smallest logical lattice is T HREE , in which f < > < t, and ft;>g is the set of the
designated elements. It provides the semantical background to many formalisms considered in
the literature (Kleene 3-valued logics with middle element designated LP [14], Priest's LPm
1
In particular t2D and f 62D.
2
[23, 24], etc.). Belnap's well-known lattice FOUR [9, 10] obtains by adding to the three ba-
sic elements a fourth one, ?, s.t. ? 62 D and :? = ?. As a results, in FOUR, beside the
two classical elements t and f , there are two intermediate elements that intuitively represent
the two cases of uncertainty: ? for a lack of knowledge, and > for \over"-knowledge (i.e., con-
tradictions). In what follows we shall sometimes abbreviate \3" for T HREE and \4" for FOUR.
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Figure 1: T HREE and FOUR
Given a logical lattice (L;D), the standard semantical notions are natural generalizations of
the classical ones: A (multiple-valued) valuation  is a function that assigns an element of L
to each atomic formula. The set of valuations onto L is denoted by V
L
. Extension to complex
formulae is done in the usual way:
1. ( _ ) = ( ) _ (),
2. ( ^ ) = ( ) ^ (),
3. (: ) = :( ).
A valuation is a model of a set of assertions if it assigns a designated value to every formula
in this set. The models of a set   are usually denoted by M or N (possibly with subscripts).
The set of all the models of   is denoted by mod( ).
The language that we will consider here is a propositional one. Note that there are no
tautologies in the language of f:;_;^g; If all the atomic formulae that appear in a formula  
are assigned ? by a valuation , then ( )=? as well. In particular, excluded middle ( _: )
is not a valid rule here. Hence, the denition of the material implication p; q as :p_q is not
adequate for representing entailments in our multiple-valued semantics. Instead, we use another
connective, which does function as an implication in our setting:
Denition 2.1 [2, 5] Let (L;D) be a logical lattice. Dene: x y= y if x2D, and x y= t
otherwise.
3
On ft; fg the material implication (;) and the new implication () are identical, and both of
them are generalisations of the classical implication. However, relative to the basic consequence
relation of logical lattices dened in 2.2, Modus Ponens and the deduction theorem fail for ;,
while both of them are valid for .
The language of f:;_;^;g together with the propositional constants t; f;>;? will be de-
noted henceforth by .
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We shall denote by p or q atomic formulae, complex formulae in  are
denoted by  or , and sets of formulae are denoted by   or . A( ) denotes the set of the
atomic formulae that appear in some formula of  .
A natural denition of a lattice-based consequence relation would now be the following:
Denition 2.2 Let (L;D) be a logical lattice. Denote   j=
L;D
 if every model of   is a model
of some formula in .
2.2 The consequence relation j=
L;D
c
The relation j=
L;D
of Denition 2.2 is a consequence relation in the standard sense of Tarski
and Scott. In [2] it is shown that this relation is sound and complete w.r.t. a certain cut-free
Gentzen-type system, and that it is also monotonic, compact, and paraconsistent [11]. The main
drawbacks of j=
L;D
are that it is strictly weaker than classical logic even for consistent theories,
and that it always invalidates some intuitively justied inference rules, like the Disjunctive Syl-
logism ( ;: _  6j=
L;D
).
In what follows we therefore consider a family of consequence relations that are obtained
by using a more liberal semantics: A formula  may be deduced from a set   of formulae if  
holds in every preferred model (and not necessarily all the models) of  . The preferred models
are determined according to some criterion for making preferences among valuations (see, e.g.,
[15, 19, 20, 21, 25]). We introduce here a general criterion for making such preferences: The
truth values are arranged according to an order relation that reects dierences in the amount
of inconsistency that each one of them exhibits. Then we choose those valuations that minimize
the amount of inconsistent knowledge w.r.t. this order. This approach reects the intuition that
contradictory data corresponds to inadequate information about the real world, and therefore
should be minimized. It will allow us to dene a family of consequence relations with many
desirable properties, some of which are considered in Section 4.
Denition 2.3 A partial order < on a set L is called modular if y<x
2
for every x
1
; x
2
; y2L
s.t. x
1
6<x
2
, x
2
6<x
1
, and y<x
1
.
2
In the context of T HREE,  will denote the language of f:;_;^;; t; f;>g.
4
Proposition 2.4 [18] Let < be a partial order on L. The following conditions are equivalent:
a) < is modular.
b) For every x
1
; x
2
; y2L, if x
1
<x
2
then either y<x
2
or x
1
<y.
c) There is a totally ordered set L
0
with a strict order  and a function g :L! L
0
s.t. x
1
<x
2
i g(x
1
)g(x
2
).
Denition 2.5 An inconsistency order <
L;D
c
on (L;D) is a well-founded modular order on the
elements of L that satises the following properties:
a) t and f are minimal and > is maximal w.r.t. <
L;D
c
,
b) if fx;:xgD while fy;:yg 6D, then x 6<
L;D
c
y,
c) x and :x are either equal or <
L;D
c
-incomparable.
Intuitively, if x<
L;D
c
y, then x represents a knowledge (or belief) that is more consistent than
the knowledge that is represented by y. The reason for requiring that an inconsistency order
would be modular is to disallow non-intuitive cases like fftg; ff <
L;D
c
? <
L;D
c
>gg, in which,
e.g., > is incomparable with t w.r.t. the amount of inconsistency that they represent (while in
this case > is comparable with :t). We also require that truth values that intuitively represent
inconsistent belief should not be less inconsistent than those ones that reect consistent belief.
Finally, a truth value should not be strictly more or strictly less (in)consistent than its negation.
Example 2.6 T HREE has two inconsistency orders:
a) The degenerated inconsistency order, <
3
c
0
, in which t; f;> are all incomparable.
b) <
3
c
1
, in which > is strictly more inconsistent than the other truth values: ft; fg<
3
c
1
>.
In FOUR there are four inconsistency orders:
a) The degenerated inconsistency order, <
4
c
0
, in which t; f;?;> are all incomparable.
b) <
4
c
1
, in which ? is considered as minimally inconsistent: ft; f;?g<
4
c
1
>.
c) <
4
c
2
, in which ? is maximally inconsistent: ft; fg<
4
c
2
f>;?g.
d) <
4
c
3
, in which ? represents some intermediate level of inconsistency: ft; fg<
4
c
3
?<
4
c
3
>.
In the rest of the paper we shall continue to use the notations of Example 2.6 for denoting
the inconsistency orders in T HREE and FOUR.
Given an inconsistency order 
L;D
c
in a logical lattice (L;D), it induces an equivalence
relation on L, in which two elements in L are equivalent if they are equal or 
L;D
c
-incomparable.
For every x2L, we denote by [x] its equivalence class w.r.t. this equivalence relation. I.e.,
5
[x]=fy j y=x; or x and y are 
L;D
c
-incomparableg.
The order relation on these classes is dened as usual by representatives: [x]
L;D
c
[y] i either
x
L;D
c
y, or x and y are 
L;D
c
-incomparable.
3
It is easy to verify that this denition is proper,
i.e. it does not depend on the choice of the representatives.
Denition 2.7 Let 
L;D
c
be an inconsistency order in a logical lattice (L;D), and let 
1
; 
2
2V
L
.
a) 
1

L;D
c

2
i for every atom p, [
1
(p)]
L;D
c
[
2
(p)].
b) 
1
<
L;D
c

2
if 
1

L;D
c

2
and there is an atomic formula q for which [
1
(q)]<
L;D
c
[
2
(q)].
Denition 2.8 Let 
L;D
c
be an inconsistency order in a logical lattice (L;D). The set of the
c-most consistent models of a set   of formulae in  (abbreviation: the c-mcms of  ) is dened
as follows:
!( ;
L;D
c
) = fM 2mod( ) j :9N 2mod( ) s.t. N<
L;D
c
Mg:
Now we can rene the inference mechanism imposed by the lattice-based consequence relation
j=
L;D
of Denition 2.2; Instead of considering every possible model of the premises, now we
should consider only the c-most consistent ones. As we shall see in Section 4, by doing so we
get more subtle consequence relations.
Denition 2.9 Let 
L;D
c
be an inconsistency order in a logical lattice (L;D). Denote   j=
L;D
c

if every c-mcm of   is a model of some formula in .
2.3 Examples
Let us demonstrate the behaviour of j=
L;D
c
on some well-known toy examples. First, we extend
the discussion to rst-order logics. It is possible to do so in a straightforward way, provided
that there are no quantiers within the formulae, and that each formula that contains variables
is considered as universally quantied. Consequently, a set of assertions   containing a non-
grounded formula,  , is viewed as representing the corresponding set of ground formulae formed
by substituting for each variable that appears in  every possible element of Herbrand universe,
U . Formally:  
U
= f( ) j  2  ;  : var( )!Ug, where  is a ground substitution from the
variables of every  2  to the individuals of U .
Example 2.10 (The Barber Paradox) Consider one direction of the barber paradox:
  = f:shaves(x; x)shaves(Barber; x)g:
Denote by 
1
, 
2
, and 
3
the valuations that assign t, ?, and > (respectively) to the assertion
shaves(Barber; Barber). Using FOUR as the underlying logical lattice, we have that
!( ;
4
c
2
)= !( ;
4
c
3
)=f
1
g; !( ;
4
c
1
)=f
1
; 
2
g; !( ;
4
c
0
)=f
1
; 
2
; 
3
g:
Thus   6j=
4
c
i
shaves(Barber; Barber) in case that i=0; 1, while   j=
4
c
i
shaves(Barber; Barber) in
case that i=2; 3.
3
As usual, we use the same notation to denote the order relation among equivalence classes and the order
relation among their elements.
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Example 2.11 (Tweety Dilemma) Consider the following well-known knowledge-base:
bird(x); fly(x)
penguin(x)  bird(x)
penguin(x)  :fly(x)
bird(Tweety)
bird(Fred)
We are using dierent implication connectives here according to the strength we attach to
each entailment: Penguins never y. This is a characteristic property of penguins, and there are
no exceptions to that. Also, every penguin is a bird, and again, there are no exceptions to that
fact. Thus, the second and the third rules are formulated with a stronger implication connective
than the rst rule, which states only a default property of birds.
Let us consider this example in FOUR. Denote the above set of assertions by  . This set
has 324 (= 18
2
) four-valued models altogether. Since the roles of Tweety and Fred are totally
symmetric, we give in Table 1 only the 18 model-assignments that concern with Tweety.
Table 1: The assignments of hPredicatei(Tweety) in mod( )
Model No. bird(Tweety) fly(Tweety) penguin(Tweety)
M
1
 M
8
> >; f >; t; f;?
M
9
 M
12
> t;? f;?
M
13
 M
16
t > >; t; f;?
M
17
 M
18
t t f;?
Here, !( ;
4
c
i
)=fM
17
;M
18
g for i=1 and !( ;
4
c
i
)=fM
17
g for i=2; 3. Thus, when using j=
4
c
i
for any 1 i3, one can infer from   that bird(Tweety) (but :bird(Tweety) is not true), and
that fly(Tweety) (while :fly(Tweety) is not true). On the other hand, :penguin(Tweety) is
deducible only by j=
4
c
2
and j=
4
c
3
(while penguin(Tweety) is not deducible by either one of them).
Suppose now that a new datum arrives, and Tweety is known to be a penguin. Denote the
new set of assertions by  
0
. I.e.,
 
0
=   [ f penguin(Tweety) g
Clearly,  
0
is no longer classically consistent. This implies that everything classically follows
from it. In particular, although the conict in  
0
has nothing to do with the information about
Fred, and despite the fact that the data about Fred has not been changed, classical logic is still
useless for reasoning about Fred, since every fact is now classically provable.
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As it is shown in Section 4.1, consequence relations of the form j=
L;D
c
are paraconsistent, and
so they do not have this drawback; Although  
0
is classically inconsistent, nontrivial conclusions
about Tweety and Fred can be obtained by j=
4
c
i
. Indeed,  
0
has 6 18 four-valued models. The
18 model assignments for the predicates that concern with Fred remain the same as those of  
(since in the information about Fred has not been changed). However, the assignments for the
predicates that are related with Tweety are totally dierent. The six new model-assignments
are listed in Table 2.
Table 2: The assignments of hPredicatei(Tweety) in mod( 
0
)
Model No. bird(Tweety) fly(Tweety) penguin(Tweety)
M
1
 M
2
> > >; t
M
3
 M
4
> f >; t
M
5
 M
6
t > >; t
This time, therefore, !( 
0
;
4
c
i
) = fM
4
;M
6
g for i = 1; 2; 3. It follows that bird(Tweety),
penguin(Tweety), and :fly(Tweety) are all deducible from  
0
relative to j=
4
c
i
(i=1; 2; 3). The
complements of these assertions cannot be inferred by any one of the consequence relations, as
indeed one expects.
3 Representation result
In this section we characterise the family of the consequence relations of the form j=
L;D
c
, as-
suming that the set V
L
of valuations onto (L;D) is stoppered w.r.t. 
L;D
c
, i.e.: for every set of
formulae   and every M 2mod( ), either M 2 !( ;
L;D
c
), or there is an M
0
2 !( ;
L;D
c
) s.t.
M
0
<
L;D
c
M .
4
Note that in case that V
L
is well-founded w.r.t. 
L;D
c
(i.e., V
L
does not have an innitely
descending chain w.r.t. 
L;D
c
), then it is in particular stoppered.
In T HREE there are only two consequence relations of the form j=
L;D
c
. One, j=
3
c
0
, corres-
ponds to the (degenerated) inconsistency order <
3
c
0
. By its denition, it is the same as j=
3
, and
so it has the properties of consequence relations of the form j=
L;D
, mentioned at the beginning
of Section 2.2. The other consequence relation, j=
3
c
1
, corresponds to the inconsistency order <
3
c
1
(see Example 2.6). This consequence relation is in fact the same as that of the logic LPm of
Priest [23, 24], and we consider its main properties in Section 5, where we compare LPm to our
formalisms.
The following theorem characterises the families of consequence relation of the form j=
L;D
c
for logical lattices with more than three elements. It is shown that in such cases FOUR is
canonical:
4
The notion \stopperdness" is due to Mackinson [20]; In [15] the same property is called smoothness.
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Theorem 3.1 Let (L;D) be a logical lattice with at least four elements, and let 
L;D
c
be
an inconsistency order in (L;D) that induces a stoppered relation on V
L
. Then there is an
inconsistency order 
4
c
i
(0 i3) in FOUR s.t.   j=
L;D
c
 i   j=
4
c
i
.
For the proof of Theorem 3.1 and for what follows we shall need the following notations and
denitions:
Notation 3.2 Given a logical lattice (L;D), its elements may be divided into the following four
sets:
T
L;D
t
=fx2L j x2D;:x 62Dg; T
L;D
f
=fx2L j x 62D;:x2Dg;
T
L;D
>
=fx2L j x2D;:x2Dg; T
L;D
?
=fx2L j x 62D;:x 62Dg:
We shall usually omit the superscripts, and just write T
t
;T
f
;T
>
, T
?
.
Notation 3.3 Let (L;D) be a logical lattice. Denote:
min

L;D
c
T
x
= fy2T
x
j :9y
0
2T
x
s.t. y
0
<
L;D
c
yg (x2ft; f;>;?g)



L;D
c
= min

L;D
c
T
t
[min

L;D
c
T
f
[min

L;D
c
T
?
[min

L;D
c
T
>
Denition 3.4 Let (L
1
;D
1
) and (L
2
;D
2
) be two logical lattices. Suppose that x
i
is some
element of L
i
and 
i
is a valuation onto L
i
(i=1; 2).
a) x
1
and x
2
are similar if for some y2ft; f;>;?g we have that x
1
2T
L
1
;D
1
y
i x
2
2T
L
2
;D
2
y
.
b) 
1
and 
2
are similar if for every atomic p, 
1
(p) and 
2
(p) are similar.
Proposition 3.5 Let (L
1
;D
1
) and (L
2
;D
2
) be two logical lattices and suppose that 
1
and 
2
are two similar valuations on L
1
and L
2
(respectively). Then for every formula  , 
1
( ) and

2
( ) are similar.
Proof: By an induction on the structure of  .
5
2
Proof of Theorem 3.1: We shall denote bym
x
some element in min

L;D
c
T
L;D
x
(x2ft; f;>;?g),
and by ! :L!ft; f;>;?g the \categorisation" function: !(y) = x i y 2 T
x
. Also, in the rest
of this proof we shall abbreviate [y] \ 


L;D
c
by [y] (thus we shall refer here to subclasses that
consist only of elements in 


L;D
c
).
Claim 3.1-A: If M 2 !( ;
L;D
c
) then for every atom p, M(p)2


L;D
c
.
Proof: Suppose that there is some atom p
0
s.t. M(p
0
) 62


L;D
c
. Then, assuming thatM(p
0
)2T
x
,
there is an m
x
2min

L;D
c
T
x
s.t. m
x
<
L;D
c
M(p
0
). Consider the following valuation:
N(p) =
(
m
x
if p = p
0
M(p) if p 6= p
0
5
The fact that D is a prime lter is crucial here.
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N is similar to M , and so, by Proposition 3.5, N is also a model of  . Moreover, N <
L;D
c
M ,
thus M 62 !( ;
L;D
c
). 2
Since 
L;D
c
is well-founded and since T
x
is nonempty for every x2ft; f;>;?g, min

L;D
c
T
x
is
nonempty as well, and so there is at least one element of the form m
x
for every x2ft; f;>;?g.
Also, it is clear that for every m
x
;m
0
x
2min

L;D
c
T
x
, [m
x
] = [m
0
x
] (otherwise either m
x
<
L;D
c
m
0
x
or m
x
>
L;D
c
m
0
x
, and so either m
0
x
62min

L;D
c
T
x
or m
x
62min

L;D
c
T
x
). It follows, therefore, that
there are no more than three equivalence classes in 


L;D
c
:
min

L;D
c
T
t
[min

L;D
c
T
f
 [t]; min

L;D
c
T
?
 [m
?
]; min

L;D
c
T
>
 [m
>
];
where m
?
is some element of min

L;D
c
T
?
, and m
>
is some element of min

L;D
c
T
>
. By Deni-
tion 2.5, [t] must be a minimal inconsistency class among those in 


L;D
c
, and [m
>
] must be a
maximal one. It follows, then, that the inconsistency classes in 


L;D
c
are arranged in one of the
following orders:
0: [t] = [m
?
] = [m
>
]; 1: [t] = [m
?
] <
L;D
c
[m
>
]
2: [t] <
L;D
c
[m
?
] = [m
>
] 3: [t] <
L;D
c
[m
?
] <
L;D
c
[m
>
]
If the order relation among the inconsistency classes in 


L;D
c
corresponds to case i above
(0 i3) we say that the inconsistency order 
L;D
c
is of type i.
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Claim 3.1-B: If 
L;D
c
is an inconsistency order of type i, then for every m;m
0
2


L;D
c
we have
that [m]<
L;D
c
[m
0
] i [!(m)]<
4
c
i
[!(m
0
)].
Proof: Immediate from the denition of inconsistency order of type i, and the denition of 
4
c
i
.
2
Claim 3.1-C: If 
L;D
c
is an inconsistency order of type i in (L;D), then j=
L;D
c
is the same as
j=
4
c
i
.
Proof: Suppose that   j=
L;D
c
 but   6j=
4
c
i
. Then there is a c
4
i
-mcmM
4
of   s.t. M
4
() 62ft;>g
for every  2. Now, for every atom p let M
L
(p) be some element in min

L;D
c
T
M
4
(p)
. Thus
!M
L
=M
4
, and M
L
is similar to M
4
. By Proposition 3.5, M
L
is a model of   and it is not
a model of any formula in . It remains to show, therefore, that M
L
is a c-mcm of   in (L;D)
(and so we will have a contradiction to   j=
L;D
c
). Indeed, otherwise by stopperdness there is a
c-mcm N
L
of   s.t. N
L
<
L;D
c
M
L
. So for every atom p, [N
L
(p)]
L;D
c
[M
L
(p)], and there is an
atom p
0
s.t. [N
L
(p
0
)]<
L;D
c
[M
L
(p
0
)]. Let N
4
=!N
L
. Again, N
4
is similar to N
L
, therefore it
is a (four-valued) model of  . Also, by its denition, for every atom p, M
L
(p)2


L;D
c
and by
Claim 3.1-A, 8p N
L
(p)2


L;D
c
. Thus, by Claim 3.1-B,
[N
4
(p)] = [!N
L
(p)] 
4
c
i
[!M
L
(p)] = [M
4
(p)]:
6
In particular, for every 0 i3, the inconsistency order 
4
c
i
in FOUR is of type i.
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Also, by the same claim,
[N
4
(p
0
)] = [!N
L
(p
0
)] <
4
c
i
[!M
L
(p
0
)] = [M
4
(p
0
)]:
It follows that N
4
<
4
c
i
M
4
, but this contradicts the assumption that M
4
is a c
4
i
-mcm of  .
For the converse, suppose that   j=
4
c
i
, but   6j=
L;D
c
. Then there is a c-mcm M
L
of   in
(L;D) s.t. M
L
() 62 D for every  2. Dene, for every atom p, M
4
(p) = !M
L
(p). By the
denition of !, M
4
is similar to M
L
and so M
4
is a model of   in FOUR, but it is not a model
of any formula in . It remains to show, then, that M
4
is a c
4
i
-mcm of  . Indeed, otherwise
there is a model N
4
of   s.t. N
4
<
4
c
i
M
4
, that is: For every atom p [N
4
(p)]
4
c
i
[M
4
(p)], and there
is an atom p
0
for which this inequality is strict: [N
4
(p
0
)]<
4
c
i
[M
4
(p
0
)]. Now, for every atom p,
let N
L
(p) be some element in min

L;D
c
T
N
4
(p)
. Thus !N
L
=N
4
, and N
L
is similar to N
4
. By
Proposition 3.5 N
L
is in particular a model of   in (L;D). Moreover, for every atom p,
[!N
L
(p)] = [N
4
(p)] 
4
c
i
[M
4
(p)] = [!M
L
(p)]:
Now, by the denition of N
L
we have that for every atom p, N
L
(p)2


L;D
c
, and by Claim 3.1-A
M
L
(p)2


L;D
c
as well. Hence, by Claim 3.1-B we have that [N
L
(p)]
L;D
c
[M
L
(p)]. Similarly,
[!N
L
(p
0
)] = [N
4
(p
0
)] <
4
c
i
[M
4
(p
0
)] = [!M
L
(p
0
)]
and again this entails that [N
L
(p
0
)]<
L;D
c
[M
L
(p
0
)]. It follows that N
L
<
L;D
c
M
L
, but this con-
tradicts the assumption that M
L
is a c-mcm of   in (L;D).
This concludes the proof of Claim 3.1-C and Theorem 3.1. 2
Below are some immediate consequences of Theorem 3.1:
Corollary 3.6 If (L;D) is a nite logical lattice then for every inconsistency order 
L;D
c
in
(L;D) there is an inconsistency order 
4
c
i
in FOUR s.t. for every nite set   of premises and
every set  of conclusions we have that   j=
L;D
c
 i   j=
4
c
i
.
Proof: The claim immediately follows from Theorem 3.1 once we show stopperdness. In fact,
in the proof of Theorem 3.1 we only had to assume that the set of models of the premises is
stoppered w.r.t. 
L;D
c
, i.e.: for every M 2mod( ) either M is a c-mcm of  , or there is a c-mcm
M
0
of   s.t. M
0
<
L;D
c
M . Here, the assumptions on (L;D) and on   guarantee the stopperdness
of mod( ). Indeed, let M some a model of  . Since L is nite, for every p2A( )
7
there are only
nite number of elements that are either 
L;D
c
-smaller than M(p) or 
L;D
c
-incomparable with
M(p). Thus, since   is nite, the amount of valuations  s.t. 8p2A( ) M(p) 6
L;D
c
(p) and
9p
0
2A( ) s.t. (p
0
)<
L;D
c
M(p
0
) is also nite. Hence there is some 
0

L;D
c
M s.t. 
0
2 !( ;
L;D
c
).
2
Corollary 3.7 Let 
L;D
c
be an inconsistency order in (L;D) that denes a stoppered relation
on V
L
. Let also m
?
2min

L;D
c
T
?
and m
>
2min

L;D
c
T
>
.
7
Recall that this means that p is an atomic formulae that appears in some formula of  .
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a) if [m
>
]=[t], then j=
L;D
c
is the same as j=
4
c
0
.
b) if [m
>
] 6=[t] and [m
?
]=[t], then j=
L;D
c
is the same as j=
4
c
1
.
c) if [m
>
] 6=[t] and [m
?
] 6=[t] and [m
>
]=[m
?
], then j=
L;D
c
is the same as j=
4
c
2
.
d) if [m
>
] 6=[t] and [m
?
] 6=[t] and [m
>
] 6=[m
?
], then j=
L;D
c
is the same as j=
4
c
3
.
Proof: Follows from the proof of Theorem 3.1. For instance, in terms of that proof, the con-
dition in part (a) assures that 
L;D
c
is of type 0. Thus j=
L;D
c
must be the same as j=
4
c
0
in this
case. Similar considerations hold for the other cases. 2
Corollary 3.7 induces a simple algorithm for determining which one of the four-valued con-
sequence relations is the same as a given consequence relation of the form j=
L;D
c
: Given an
inconsistency order 
L;D
c
in (L;D), choose some m
?
2min

L;D
c
T
?
and m
>
2min

L;D
c
T
>
. If it
is true that [m
>
]= [t], then j=
L;D
c
is the same as j=
4
c
0
. Otherwise, if [m
?
]= [t], then j=
L;D
c
is the
same as j=
4
c
1
. Otherwise, if [m
>
]= [m
?
], then j=
L;D
c
is the same as j=
4
c
2
. Otherwise j=
L;D
c
is the
same as j=
4
c
3
.
4 Reasoning with j=
L;D
c
Our goal in this section is to show that consequence relations of the form j=
L;D
c
are particularly
suitable for imitating commonsense reasoning. For this we consider some of their useful proper-
ties. By Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.6, when stopperdness is assumed or the set of premises is
nite, it is sucient to consider only the logical lattices T HREE and FOUR. In what follows
we therefore consider the four basic four-valued consequence relations j=
4
c
i
(i= 0;: : : ; 3). Sim-
ilar results are easily obtained for the basic three-valued relations j=
3
c
0
and j=
3
c
1
(see also the
discussion on three-valued consequence relations in Section 5).
Proposition 4.1 Let  ; be two sets of formulae in .
a) The consequence relations j=
4
c
i
, 0 i3, are all dierent.
b) For every 1 i3, if   j=
4
c
0
 then   j=
4
c
i
.
c) No one of j=
4
c
1
, j=
4
c
2
, and j=
4
c
3
, is stronger than the other.
Proof:
a) Consider the set  =f:q; (pq)_(:q:p); (:pq)_(:qp)g. Table 3 lists the c
4
i
-mcms of
 . It is easy to verify that for every 0 i3 the consequences of   w.r.t. j=
4
c
i
are dierent. Let
Th
i
( ) = f j   j=
4
c
i
 g. Then from Table 3 it follows that Th
0
( ) Th
2
( ) Th
3
( ) Th
1
( ).
Moreover, qp2Th
1
( ) n Th
3
( ), pq2Th
3
( ) n Th
2
( ), and q (p_:p)2Th
2
( ) n Th
0
( ), so
the inclusions are proper.
b) Obvious.
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Table 3: The c
4
i
-mcms of  
p q c
4
0
-mcms c
4
1
-mcms c
4
2
-mcms c
4
3
-mcms
M
1
? f + + + +
M
2
> f + { + {
M
3
t > + { + +
M
4
f > + { + +
M
5
? > + { { {
M
6
> > + { { {
c) In part (a) we have considered an example in which Th
2
( )Th
3
( )Th
1
( ). On the other
hand, p _ :p 2 Th
2
(;) and p _ :p 2 Th
3
(;), while p _ :p 62 Th
1
(;). It remains to show, then,
that j=
4
c
3
is not stronger than j=
4
c
2
. For that consider the following set:  
0
= fp; (:p  q) 
q; q :q; :q qg. The only c
4
2
-mcm of  
0
is M
1
(p) = t, M
1
(q) =>, while the c
4
3
-mcms of  
0
are M
1
and M
2
(p) =>, M
2
(q) =?. Thus, e.g.,  
0
j=
4
c
2
q while  
0
6j=
4
c
3
q. In this case, therefore,
Th
3
( 
0
)Th
2
( 
0
). 2
Next we consider some more general properties of j=
4
c
i
(0 i 3). In what follows we shall
write j=
4
c
for referring to any of j=
4
c
i
, 0 i3.
4.1 Oscillation between classical and paraconsistent inferences
A desirable property of formalisms for managing inconsistent information is that they will to be
able to draw classical conclusions from (classically) consistent theories, and will not \explode"
the set of conclusions when the theory becomes inconsistent. Batens [7] describes this property
as an \oscillation" between some lower limit (paraconsistent) logic and an upper limit (classical)
logic: The rules of the lower limit logic are unconditionally correct, while supplementary rules
of the upper limit logic are correct under certain conditions that depend on the premises. In
this section we show that this is the case in our framework.
Proposition 4.2 j=
4
c
is paraconsistent.
Proof: Indeed, p;:p 6j=
4
c
q. To see that consider a valuation , for which (p)=> and (q)=f . 2
In what follows we denote by j=
2
the classical consequence relation.
Proposition 4.3 If   j=
4
c
 then   j=
2
.
Proof: Let M be a classical model of  . Since the set ft; fg is closed under the corresponding
operations, there is no dierence between viewing M as a valuation in FOUR and viewing
it as a valuation in ft; fg. Hence M is also a model of   in FOUR. Now, since M assigns
only classical truth values to the atomic formulae, M must be a c-mcm of   in FOUR. Since
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  j=
4
c
, there is some 2 s.t. M()2ft;>g. But we also know that M()2ft; fg, and so ne-
cessarily M()= t. It follows thatM is a classical model of some formula in , and so   j=
2
. 2
The converse of Proposition 4.3 is not true in general. For instance, excluded middle is not
valid w.r.t. j=
4
c
0
and j=
4
c
1
. However, with respect to the other basic four-valued consequence
relations the converse of Proposition 4.3 does hold.
Proposition 4.4 Let   be a classically consistent theory. Then for every formula  we have
that   j=
2
 i   j=
4
c
2
 i   j=
4
c
3
.
Proof: Immediately follows from the fact that the set of the c
4
2
-mcms and the set of the c
4
3
-mcms
of a classically consistent theory   are the same as the set of the classical models of  . 2
By Propositions 4.2 and 4.4 we obtain the following important property of (any consequence
relation of the form j=
L;D
c
that is equivalent to) j=
4
c
2
and j=
4
c
3
:
Corollary 4.5 j=
4
c
2
and j=
4
c
3
are the same as classical logic w.r.t. consistent theories, and are
not trivial w.r.t. inconsistent theories.
4.2 Nonmonotonicity and plausibility
Proposition 4.6 j=
4
c
0
is a monotonic consequence relation, while j=
4
c
i
, i=1; 2; 3, are nonmono-
tonic.
Proof: For the rst part, note that j=
4
c
0
is in fact the same as j=
4
, which is clearly monotonic.
For the other part, consider  = fp;:p_qg. Since M(p) = t, M(q) = t is the only c
4
i
-mcm of  
for i=1; 2; 3, it follows that   j=
4
c
i
q (i=1; 2; 3). However, as in the proof of Proposition 4.2, it
is easy to see that  ;:p 6j=
4
c
i
q for i=1; 2; 3. 2
Note that by Corollary 3.7 and Proposition 4.6 it follows that j=
L;D
c
is nonmonotonic i [t]\
min

L;D
c
T
>
=;. It follows that unless the inconsistency order under consideration is degenerated,
the consequence relation that is based on it is nonmonotonic. Thus, most of the relations of
the form j=
L;D
c
are not consequence relations in the standard sense of Tarski and Scott. In such
cases it is usual to require weaker conditions:
Proposition 4.7 j=
4
c
is a plausibility logic in the sense of Lehmann [16]. I.e., the following
properties are satised:
Inclusion:  ;  j=
4
c
 .
Right Monotonicity: If   j=
4
c
, then   j=
4
c
 ;.
Cautious Left Monotonicity: If   j=
4
c
 and   j=
4
c
, then  ;  j=
4
c
.
8
8
This rule was rst proposed in [13].
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Cautious Cut: If  ;  j=
4
c
 and   j=
4
c
 ;, then   j=
4
c
.
Proof: Inclusion and Right Monotonicity immediately follow from the denition of j=
4
c
. For
Cautious Left Monotonicity, assume that   j=
4
c
 , and   j=
4
c
. Let M be some c-mcm of  [f g.
In particular, M is a model of  . Moreover, it must be a c-mcm of   as well, since otherwise
there would have been some N 2mod( ) s.t. N <
4
c
M . Since   j=
4
c
 , this N would have been
a model of   [ f g which is strictly less inconsistent than M . Hence M cannot be a c-mcm of
  [ f g, with a contradiction to the choice of M . Therefore, M is a c-mcm of  . Now, since
  j=
4
c
, M is a model of some 2. Hence  ;  j=
4
c
.
It remains to show Cautious Cut: Let M be a c-mcm of  . Suppose, for a contradiction,
that  ;  j=
4
c
 and   j=
4
c
 ;, but M() 62D for every  2 ft;>g. Since   j=
4
c
 ;, necessarily
M( )2ft;>g, and soM is a model of  [f g. Moreover, M must be a c-mcm model of  [f g,
since any other model of this set that is strictly smaller than M w.r.t. 
4
c
must be in particular
a model of  , which is 
4
c
-smaller than M . Now,  ;  j=
4
c
, therefore M()2 ft;>g for some
2 { a contradiction. 2
4.3 Rationality
In [18] Lehmann and Magidor consider some properties of nonmonotonic reasoning that a \ra-
tional" nonmonotonic consequence relation should satisfy. One property that is considered as
particularly important is motivated by the following example: Suppose that all we know about
normal birds is that they can y. Then, unless anything else is known about red birds, it seems
reasonable to assume that (normal) red birds can y as well. This property is sometimes called
the \irrelevance problem": A reasoner does not have to retract any previous conclusion when
learning about a new fact that has no inuence on the set of premises. Consequence relations
that satisfy this property are called rational . As the next proposition shows, the consequence
relations j=
4
c
i
are rational:
Proposition 4.8 If   j=
4
c
 and A(  [) \A()=;, then  ; j=
4
c
.
Proof: If  ; 6j=
4
c
, then there is an M 2 !(  [ ;
4
c
) s.t. for every 2, M() 62 ft;>g. Let
m be some 
4
c
-minimal element. Consider the following valuation:
N(p) =
(
M(p) if p2A(  [)
m otherwise
Clearly, N is a model of   and for every  2, N() 62 ft;>g. Since   j=
4
c
, N cannot be a
c-mcm of  , and so there is a model N
0
of   s.t. N
0
<
4
c
N . By the denition of N , there is some
p
0
2A(  [) s.t. N
0
(p
0
)<
4
c
N(p
0
). Now, consider the following valuation:
M
0
(p) =
(
N
0
(p) if p2A(  [)
M(p) otherwise
Clearly, M
0
<
4
c
M , and since M
0
is the same as N
0
on A( ), M
0
is also a model of  . Moreover,
using the facts that A( [)\A()=; and that M is a model of , it follows that M
0
is also
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a model of . Hence M
0
is a model of   [ , which is strictly 
4
c
-smaller than M , but this is a
contradiction to the choice of M . 2
Note: In order to assure rationality, Lehmann and Magidor introduced the following inference
rule (see [18]):
rational monotonicity: if   j then  ;  j , unless   j:.
Rational monotonicity might be considered as a requirement that is too strong for assuring
rationality, and there are many general patterns of nonmonotonic reasoning that do not satisfy
rational monotonicity. For instance, the following example shows that rational monotonicity is
not sound w.r.t. j=
4
c
1
: p; q:p j=
4
c
1
:p:q and p; q:p 6j=
4
c
1
:q, but p; q; q:p 6j=
4
c
1
:p:q.
4.4 Adaptivity
Consider the following set of formulae:  
1
=fp;:p;:p _ qg. Since :p is true in  
1
, so is :p _ q
(even if q is false), and so a plausible inference mechanism should not apply here the Disjunctive
Syllogism to p and :p _ q. Thus, plausible paraconsistent systems should not validate the Dis-
junctive Syllogism in any case. On the other hand, in the case of  
2
=fp;:p; r;:r_qg, applying
the Disjunctive Syllogism to r and :r _ q may be justied by the fact that the subset of for-
mulae to which the Disjunctive Syllogism is applied should not be aected by the inconsistency,
therefore inference rules that are classically valid can be applied to it.
This is the basic idea behind Baten's inconsistency adaptive logics [6, 7, 8]. Such logics are
capable of handling theories with contradictions in a nontrivial way, but presuppose a consist-
ency of all sentences `unless and until proven otherwise'. By interpreting a theory `as consistently
as possible', they adapt to the specic inconsistencies that occur in it.
As Proposition 4.9 below shows, the consequence relations j=
4
c
2
and j=
4
c
3
are adaptive; If
one can distinguish between a consistent part and an inconsistent part of a given theory, then
every assertion that is not related to the inconsistent part, and which classically follows from
the consistent part, is also a j=
4
c
i
-consequence (i=2; 3) of the whole theory.
Proposition 4.9 Let   =  
0
[  
00
be a set of formulae in  s.t. A( 
0
) \ A( 
00
) = ;. If  
0
is
classically consistent, then for every set  s.t. A() \ A( 
00
)=;, the fact that  
0
j=
2
 entails
that   j=
4
c
2
 and   j=
4
c
3
.
Proof: We show here the case of j=
4
c
2
; The argument for j=
4
c
3
is the same. Suppose that  
0
j=
2
.
By Proposition 4.4  
0
j=
4
c
2
, and by Proposition 4.8, since A( 
0
[) \A( 
00
)=;, we have that
  j=
4
c
2
. 2
5 Comparative study
Many systems for preferential reasoning have been considered in the literature. Here we briey
mention some closely related ones. First, as we have already noted, j=
3
c
0
corresponds to one
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of the basic three-valued paraconsistent logics LP [14], and j=
4
c
0
corresponds to the four-valued
logic of Belnap [9, 10]. Also, as it is shown in Proposition 4.4, j=
4
c
2
and j=
4
c
3
are the same as the
classical consequence relation w.r.t. theories that are classically consistent.
Another closely related formalism is Priest's three-valued logic of minimally inconsistent
models [23, 24]. The consequence relation j=
3
LPm
of the resulting logic, LPm, is dened in
T HREE as follows:   j=
3
LPm
 i every model of   that assign > only to some minimal set
of atomic formulae is a model of a formulae in . It follows that this consequence relation
is actually the same as the one denoted here by j=
3
c
1
.
9
The following proposition indicates a
possible reduction of our four-valued consequence relations to Priest's LPm:
Proposition 5.1 Suppose that A(  [)= fp
1
; p
2
; : : :g. Then, for any 1 i 3,   j=
3
LPm
 i
 ; p
1
_:p
1
; p
2
_:p
2
; : : : j=
4
c
i
.
Proof: The three-valued models of   are the same as the four-valued models of  [fp
1
_:p
1
; p
2
_
:p
2
; : : :g. Since each one of these models assigns to the atomic formulae in A(  [ f g) values
from ft; f;>g, the LPm-models of   are the same as the c
i
-mcms of   [ fp
1
_:p
1
; p
2
_:p
2
; : : :g
for i=1; 2; 3. 2
In the language without  (which is the language that is considered in [23, 24]), Priest's
logic is the same as j=
4
c
2
and j=
4
c
3
:
Proposition 5.2 Let  ; be two sets of formulae in the language of f:;_;^; t; fg. Then
  j=
3
LPm
 i   j=
4
c
2
 i   j=
4
c
3
.
Proposition 5.2 follows from the next proposition, which implies that in the language of
f:;_;^; t; fg, the consequence relations j=
4
c
2
and j=
4
c
3
are in fact three-valued:
Proposition 5.3 Let   be a set of formulae in the language of f:;_;^; t; fg. Then:
a) If M is a c
2
-mcm of   then there is no formula  s.t. M( )=?.
b) If M is a c
3
-mcm of   then there is no formula  s.t. M( )=?.
Proof: We only show part (a); The proof of part (b) is similar. First, note that ft; f;>g
is closed under :;_ and ^. Now, let M be some c
2
-mcm of  . Dene a transformation
g : ft; f;>;?g ! ft; f;>g as follows: g(?) = t, and g(x) = x otherwise. As it is easily veri-
ed, for every formulae  in the language of f:;_;^; t; fg s.t. M( ) is designated, gM( ) is
designated as well. It follows that gM is also a model of  . Since gM 
4
c
2
M , necessarily
gM=M . 2
9
In fact, in [23, 24] the consequence relation under consideration is single-conclusioned. We use here the
obvious extension to the multiple-conclusion case.
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Another formalism, which is a particular case of the one considered here, was introduced in
[1, 2]. This formalism is based on the notion of inconsistency sets in logical lattices.
10
Intuit-
ively, an inconsistency set I in a logical lattice (L;D) contains the elements of L that represent
inconsistent knowledge or belief. Formally, a subset I of a lattice L is called an inconsistency
set if for every x2L the following two conditions hold: (a) x2I i :x2I, and (b) x2D \ I i
x2T
L;D
>
.
Let I(;I) denote the set of atomic formulae that are assigned an inconsistent value by a
valuation . I.e.,
I(;I) = fp j p is atomic and (p)2Ig:
Given an inconsistency set I in a logical lattice (L;D), a valuation 
1
is more consistent
(w.r.t. I) than a valuation 
2
(notation 
1
<
L;D
I

2
) if I(
1
;I) I(
2
;I). A valuation  is an
I-most consistent model of   (I-mcm of  , for short), if  2mod( ) and there is no model of
  which is more consistent than . Finally,   j=
L;D
I
 if every I-mcm of   is a model of some
formulae in .
As the following propositions show, the notion of inconsistency orders is a renement of the
notion of inconsistency sets:
Proposition 5.4 Let I be an inconsistency set in (L;D). The order relation 
L;D
I
, dened on
L by x
L;D
I
y if x 62I and y2I, is an inconsistency order.
Proof: It is easy to verify that 
L;D
I
satises all the conditions in Denition 2.5. 2
Proposition 5.5 Let (L;D) be a logical lattice, and let I=T
>
. Then for every inconsistency
order 
L;D
c
in (L;D) there is an \intermediate" inconsistency level [i] s.t. for every x
c
2 [i] and
every y2L, if y>
L;D
c
x
c
then y2I, and if y<
L;D
c
x
c
then y 62I.
Proof: Let [i]=min

L;D
c
f[x] j 9y2 [x] s.t. y2T
>
g.
11
This denition entails the second part of
the claim, since if y<
L;D
c
x
c
for some y2L and x
c
2 [i], then [y]< [i], and so there is no element
in [y] (especially y itself) that belongs to I. For the other part, let x
c
2 [i] and let y 2 L s.t.
y >
L;D
c
x
c
. By the denition of [i], there is some x
0
2 [x
c
] s.t. x
0
2T
>
. In particular, x
c
and x
0
are either equal or 
L;D
c
-incomparable, and since 
L;D
c
is modular, necessarily y >
L;D
c
x
0
. By
Denition 2.5(b), y2T
>
as well. 2
Corollary 5.6 The family of consequence relations of the form j=
L;D
c
strictly contains the family
of the consequence relations of the form j=
L;D
I
.
Proof: Follows from the fact that in terms of Proposition 5.4, j=
L;D
I
is the same as j=
L;D
c
where

L;D
c
is 
L;D
I
. 2
10
The algebraic structures considered in [1, 2] are logical bilattices. This is a particular family of logical lattices.
11
Note that since 
L;D
c
is well-founded, [i] cannot be empty.
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6 Conclusion
We have introduced a general and simple formalism for reasoning with uncertainty. The under-
lying concept behind it was the rationality of the consequences that it allows. Although many
real-life inferences turn out to be wrong, especially in the presence of incomplete or inconsistent
information, we always expect them to be \rational". A variety of properties were considered
for supporting the plausibility of the reasoning process introduced here, and for showing that
it indeed provides \rational" consequences from data that might be incomplete or inconsistent.
In addition, we have provided a characterization result that shows that the consequence rela-
tions considered here can be represented in Belnap's four-valued algebraic structure, FOUR.
This is another evidence for the central role FOUR has among (logical) lattices; In many cases
only a four-valued lattice is sucient for constructing a \robust" framework for reasoning with
uncertainty (see also [3]).
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